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First Blow | Detroit |
Queenston Heights | Stoney Creek |
Maps
The Principles of War can
be illustrated by small campaigns as well as great, and by old campaigns as well
as those of our own times. It would be difficult to find a series of operations
providing a much better object lesson than those of 1812 in which Major-General
Sir Isaac Brock defeated the attempt of superior United States forces to conquer
the Province of Upper Canada. This campaign, fought nearly a century and a half
ago against an adversary who is now the fast friend and essential ally or
Canada, will repay study by anyone seeking enlightenment as to the qualities
that make a great commander.
The Situation at the
Outbreak of fighting
When the United States
declared war in June 1812, General Brock was in command of the forces in Upper
Canada and was also temporarily administering the civil government of the
province. The military problem that faced him was one of extreme difficulty,
for the force at his disposal was very small and the boundary line to be
defended was very long.
There was only one British
regiment of the line in Upper Canada. This was the 41st (which is now the Welch
Regiment). There was also a considerable detachment of the 10th Royal Veteran
Battalion, another of the Royal Newfoundland Fencibles (chiefly used as marines
on the Lakes) and one artillery company. Behind these regular forces stood the
provincial Militia, which was simply the men of military age organized in paper
battalions on a basis of universal service, and at the outbreak of war virtually
without training. A considerably larger British force, including five
battalions of the line, was stationed in Lower Canada. All told, the two
Canada’s (now Ontario and Quebec) were defended by roughly 7000 troops fit to be
considered regulars; of these, only a little over 1600 were in the upper
province.
The United States
Government had of course a relatively tremendous reservoir of manpower to draw
upon, but its regular army was small. Though the establishment when war broke
out was more than 35,000 all ranks, the actual strength was much less. The
total number of regulars serving may have been in the vicinity of 13,000.
Moreover, a large proportion of these were very recent recruits, and the
effective force was certainly not superior to the British regulars in the
Canadas alone. During the war, the United States called into service over
450,000 militiamen; but the average efficiency of these citizen soldiers, as
events on the battlefield amply showed, was decidedly low.
The greater part of the
British force had, however, to be retained in Lower Canada, for strategically
this was the most important part of the country. Had the Americans followed a
sound line of operations, they would have concentrated against Montreal, using
the excellent communications available by Lake Champlain and the Richelieu
River. The capture of Montreal would have severed the essential line of
communication that by the St. Lawrence-on which the defence of Upper Canada
entirely depended, and the whole of that province would have fallen into their
hands at an early date. The Americans, however, instead of acting in this
manner, operated mainly against the frontier of Upper Canada, chopping at the
upper branches of the tree rather than the trunk or the roots. In a long view
this was fortunate, but it meant that the first shock of their attack had to be
met by very inadequate British forces.
In the first months of the
war, however, the defenders had one decided advantage: they possessed a distinct
naval superiority on the Great Lakes. This was due to the existence of the
force known as the Provincial Marine of Upper Canada. In a naval sense this
force was very inefficient (it was primarily a transport service and was
administered by the Quartermaster-General's Department of the Army); but its
armed vessels were superior to anything possessed by the Americans on the Lakes
in the beginning, and it was in great part responsible for the preservation of
Upper Canada in the first campaign. It must be noted that at this time the land
communications of the province were extremely primitive, the roads being very
few and very bad. Only by water could troops be moved with any speed.
Against this advantage we
must balance a disadvantage. A large
proportion of the population of Upper Canada were recent immigrants from the
United States, people who could not be expected to come forward to repel an
American invasion. Many other Upper Canadians, though loyal enough in a passive
way, considered that the Americans' superiority in physical strength made
defence useless. In view of the Canadian schoolbook legend of 1812, it may come
as a surprise to some people to know that in July Brock wrote to the Adjutant
General at Headquarters in Lower Canada as follows:
My situation is most
critical, not from any, thing the enemy can do, but from the disposition of the
people - The population, believe me is essentially bad - A full belief possesses
them all that this Province must inevitably succumb - This prepossession is
fatal to every exertion - Legislators, Magistrates, Militia Officers, all, have
imbibed the idea, and are so sluggish and indifferent in all their respective
offices that the artful and active scoundrel is allowed to parade the Country
without interruption, and commit all imaginable mischief . .
What a change an additional
regiment would make in this part of the Province! Most of the people have lost
all confidence I however speak loud and look big. .
No commentary upon the
campaign of 1812 should overlook this element in the situation. With greatly
superior forces assembling on the frontier, and with the morale of the
population (which was largely identical with the Militia) at such a low ebb,
many a commander would have adopted a supine defensive attitude. It was the
greatness of Brock that, far from allowing these circumstances to discourage
him, he realized that the best hope of carrying out his task successfully lay in
assuming a vigorous local offensive.
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