The Capture of Detroit
General Brock with his small force could not
take the offensive at any
point on the frontier without leaving other
points unguarded, and had the Americans been enterprising and efficient his
situation would have been impossible. As it was, his own first move was to the
Niagara frontier, where he contemplated an attack on Fort Niagara. However, he
did not attempt this, arguing that it was more important to get on with training
the militia; and the Americans made no immediate offensive move in this sector.
Brock then returned to York (now Toronto), the provincial capital, for the
session of the legislature. This gave him an opportunity, in his civil
capacity, of addressing himself to the province and giving a strong lead to its
people, so many of whom were uncertain and disheartened.
By the time the Assembly was prorogued, it was
clear that for the moment the main threat to Upper Canada was on the Detroit
frontier. Brock immediately launched a vigorous counteroffensive. Hull's
invasion and a bombastic proclamation which he had issued had considerably
discouraged the Canadian militia along the Detroit; but when Brock asked those
assembled at York for volunteers to march against the invaders, more came
forward than transport could be found for. The general had already ordered a
small regular reinforcement to Amherstburg. He had
tried
to
organize a force to operate on the Thames, but this had been largely frustrated
by the unwillingness of the militia in the nearby districts. He now dispatched
100 militiamen from York to the Long Point district on Lake Erie. At that
place, he wrote to Prevost on 29 July, "I propose collecting a force for the
relief of Amherstburg."
On the night of 5 August, the same day on which
he prorogued the Assembly, Brock himself sailed from York for the head of Lake
Ontario. Pushing rapidly on overland to Port Dover, he found the relief force
awaiting him there, along with boats to carry them up Lake Erie. (Colonel Thomas
Talbot, the redoubtable founder of the Talbot Settlement, had had considerable
difficulty with the militia of the district, but had finally obtained a fair
number of volunteers.) On the 8th Brock embarked his tiny "mass of maneuver",
which amounted in all to about 50 regulars and 250 militia with one 6,pounder,
and, coasting along the lake shore, reached Amherstburg and made a junction with
the British force there on the night of 13 August. Bad weather and bad boats
had delayed the movement, which nevertheless seems very rapid in the existing
circumstances.
The general immediately
divided his whole force into three miniature "brigades", two consisting of
militia stiffened by small regular detachments and the third of the main body of
the 41st Regiment. On 15 August orders were issued for crossing the Detroit and
moving against the American army.
Few officers would care to cross a broad river
with the prospect of attacking on the farther shore a force twice as strong as
their own in a fortified position. Brock himself recorded afterwards that his
colonels advised against it. The general, however, was taking a "calculated
risk". The captured correspondence had told him how low was the Americans'
morale and how discouraged their commander, and the very fact of their retreat
from Canadian territory had further emphasized the poor state of their army.
Even so, his decision remains a fine example of the offensive spirit which wins
battles.
On the evening of 15 August Brock opened fire
upon Fort Detroit with five guns which had been emplaced on the Canadian shore.
The bombardment inflicted some casualties and further discouraged the Americans;
Brock had made a judicious contribution to the disintegration of poor Hull by
sending him a demand for surrender which remarked that, while he did not intend
to "join in a war of extermination," the Indians would "be beyond control the
moment the contest commences", and soon after daylight on the 16th the little
British force crossed the river in boats and landed three miles below Detroit.
The army consisted of some 700 white troops, of whom 400 were militia, and 600
Indians, with five small field guns. The battery opposite Detroit was served on
this day by gunners landed from the Provincial Marine. Although Brock does not
mention it, Hull in his apologia emphasizes that the British landed "under cover
of their ships of war", and it is clear that co -operation between the land
forces and the Marine was close throughout.
Brock had planned to take up a strong position
and trust to the effect of his artillery fire to compel Hull
to come
out and meet him in the open field. He now received information, however, that
a detachment of 500 men had left Detroit three days before and that their
cavalry were only three miles in rear of his own
force. He accordingly
took another
bold decision-to make an immediate assault upon
Detroit. The troops advanced upon the fort, but before the attack could begin
the American commander sent forward a flag of truce and proposed a discussion of
terms. The sequel was the surrender within an hour of Hull's whole army
(including the detachment above referred to), with 35 guns and a great quantity
of other arms and stores.
Thus General Brock had n a resounding victory
and entirely removed the menace to the western frontier, almost without firing a
shot. Well might he write to the Commander-in, Chief, "@en I detail my good
fortune Your Excellency will be astonished." There was, however, more than good
fortune to thank for what had happened. The energy and boldness with which
Brock himself had acted were the chief causes of this extraordinary result.
On Hull's own showing, it was the vulnerability
of his communications (constantly exposed to interruption as a result of the
British control of the water), and the fear of the Indians, that induced him to
his ignominious surrender. As he t it, the loss of Mackinac had “opened the
northern hive of Indians" and the expectation of the upper tribes "swarming
down" upon his army went far to take the heart out
of him. What the success at Mackinac
had done
in the case of the Indians the capture
of Detroit may be said to have done among the white population of Upper Canada.
This brilliant victory silenced the croakers and encouraged loyal citizens.*
Canadians now realized that a successful defense of the country was quite
possible. The militiamen whom so many had considered dupes suddenly became
saviours and heroes, and before the year 1812 was over the Canadian legend that
attributes the saving of the country primarily to the militia was already well
on the way to establishment.
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