Comments
The French
had reason to be proud of the manner in which they had met and repulsed the
attack, but much of the explanation for the victory lies in the inefficiency of
the New England force. The great
Bostonian historian Parkman penned in 1877 what may be regarded as the best
possible commentary: "Massachusetts had made her usual mistake. She had confidently believed that ignorance
and inexperience could match the skill of a tried veteran, and that the rude
courage of her fishermen and farmers could triumph without discipline or
leadership ... A trading republic, without trained officers, may win victories;
but it wins them either by accident, or by an extravagant outlay in money and
life."
Frontenac's
defensive measures were well calculated.
As we have said, the only serious allegation that can be made against
him is that of over-caution. He
repulsed the enemy, but because he did not feel equal to taking the offensive
he did not destroy him. It must be said
in Frontenac's favour that with the season so far advanced (when Phips appeared
it was over a month later than the date of the Battle of the Plains of Abraham
in 1759) the Governor had only to hold his position for a limited time, and the
approach of winter would then inevitably drive the invaders away. All the same, he had a larger force than
Phips', and it was of better quality; and he had an opportunity, by running
some risk, to strike a most telling blow at the English in America. We can admire his realistic recognition of
the shortcomings of European-trained troops in American warfare; but did he
not, perhaps, overdo it?
It may
seem almost ludicrous to discuss this small episode, which sometimes verges on
the comic, in terms of the Principles of War.
Nevertheless, in this as in every action the operation of those
principles can be observed.
The static
defensive measures of Frontenac and Prevost made ample and most useful
provision for Security; what was lacking in the French operations in the final
phase was the Offensive Action, which might so usefully have been launched from
this firm base. The failure of the
English to implement effectively their plan for a double attack enabled
Frontenac to effect at Quebec a Concentration of Force, which made their
success there
virtually impossible.
This concentration was facilitated in turn by the Flexibility conferred
upon the French by their possession of easy and rapid water communications, by
way of the St. Lawrence, from one end of the colony to the other.
The English
colonists, on the other hand, seem to have sinned against almost every sound
principle of action that has ever been enunciated. Notably, the slowness of their proceedings at every point
deprived them of all chance of achieving that
Surprise which was their
best hope of victory. Not entirely
through the fault of the colonial planners, their Administration was
inadequate; the expedition was launched without being provided with the
supplies essential to success. The
spirit of Co-operation was sadly lacking within the New England force, with the
results that might have been expected.
Finally, as the consequence of many circumstances, but mainly the
absence of energetic, determined and informed leadership, it seems clear that
the Morale of the expedition declined steadily from the moment when it arrived
before the enemy. The New Englanders
were fortunate not to suffer a worse disaster than the one that actually befell
them.
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