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UNEF I
was established to secure and
supervise the cessation of hostilities,
including the withdrawal of the armed forces of
France, Israel and the United Kingdom from
Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to
serve as a buffer between the Egyptian and
Israeli forces |
 |
UNEF I – the first Untied Nations
peacekeeping force – was established by the first
emergency special session of the General Assembly which
was held from 1 to 10 November 1956. The mandate of the
Force was to secure and supervise the cessation of
hostilities, including the withdrawal of the armed
forces of France, Israel and the United Kingdom from
Egyptian territory and, after the withdrawal, to serve
as a buffer between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and
to provide impartial supervision of the ceasefire. UNEF
was withdrawn in May-June 1967, at Egypt's request.
In October 1956, the United Nations faced a major
crisis. The 1949 General Armistice Agreement between
Egypt and Israel – concluded under the auspices of and
supervised by the United Nations – collapsed when Israel
and two major Powers occupied large portions of Egyptian
territory. The Organization reacted to the crisis with
speed and firmness and, to overcome it, conceived a new
form of peacekeeping and set up its first peacekeeping
force. This historic development was made possible
mainly through the vision, resourcefulness and
determination of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld and
Mr. Lester Pearson, who was at the time Secretary for
External Affairs of Canada.
Since the summer of 1955, relations between Egypt and
Israel had been steadily deteriorating, despite the
efforts of the Chief of Staff of the United Nations
Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the
Secretary-General himself. Palestinian fedayeen, with
the support of the Egyptian Government, had been
launching frequent raids against Israel from their bases
in Gaza, and these had been followed by increasingly
strong reprisal attacks by Israeli armed forces. The
decision taken by Egypt in the early 1950s to restrict
Israeli shipping through the Suez Canal and the Strait
of Tiran at the entrance to the Gulf of Aqaba, in
contravention of a decision of the Security Council,
remained a controversial and destabilizing issue. In the
heightening tension, the control of armaments – which
the Tripartite Declaration of France, the United Kingdom
and the United States, of May 1950, had sought to
achieve in the Middle East – had broken down, and Egypt
and Israel were engaging in an intense arms race, with
the East and the West supplying sophisticated weapons
and equipment to the opposing sides.
On 19 July 1956, the United States Government decided to
withdraw its financial aid for the Aswan Dam project on
the Nile River. President Gamal Abdel Nasser announced
the nationalization of the Suez Canal Company a week
later and declared that Canal dues would be used to
finance the Aswan project.
On 23 September 1956, the Governments of France and the
United Kingdom requested the President of the Security
Council to convene the Council to consider the
“situation created by the unilateral action of the
Egyptian Government in bringing to an end the system of
international operation of the Suez Canal, which was
confirmed and completed by the Suez Canal Convention of
1888”. On the following day, Egypt countered with a
request that the Security Council consider “actions
against Egypt by some Powers, particularly France and
the United Kingdom, which constitute a danger to
international peace and security and are serious
violations of the Charter of the United Nations”.
The Security Council first met on 26 September to
consider both items. At the same time, private
negotiations were being carried out between the Foreign
Ministers of the three countries with the good offices
of the Secretary-General. By 12 October, the
Secretary-General was able to work out six principles on
which there seemed to be general agreement. These
principles were incorporated in a draft resolution which
the Security Council unanimously adopted on the next
day. This became resolution 118 (1956), by which the
Security Council agreed that “any settlement of the Suez
question should meet the following requirements:
(1) There should be free and open transit through
the Canal without discrimination, overt or covert –
this covers both political and technical aspects;
(2) The sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
(3) The operation of the Canal should be insulated
from the politics of any country;
(4) The manner of fixing tolls and charges should be
decided by agreement between Egypt and the users;
(5) A fair proportion of the dues should be allotted
to development;
(6) In case of disputes, unresolved affairs between
the Suez Canal Company and the Egyptian Government
should be settled by arbitration with suitable terms
of reference and suitable provisions for the payment
of sums found to be due.”
Following the adoption of this resolution, the
Secretary-General announced that he would pursue his
efforts to promote an agreement based on the principles
laid down by the Security Council. However, a new
situation developed in late October 1956, when Israel,
in cooperation with the British and French Governments,
launched an all-out attack on Egypt.
The Israeli forces crossed the border on the morning of
29 October. In the early hours of 30 October, the Chief
of Staff of UNTSO, Major-General E.L.M. Burns (Canada),
called for a ceasefire and requested Israel to pull its
forces back to its side of the border. In the afternoon
of the same day, the British and French Governments
addressed a joint ultimatum to Egypt and Israel calling
on both sides to cease hostilities within 12 hours and
to withdraw their forces to a distance of 10 miles on
each side of the Suez Canal. They also requested Egypt
to allow Anglo-French forces to be stationed temporarily
on the Canal at Port Said, Ismailia and Suez for the
purpose of separating the belligerents and ensuring the
safety of shipping. The ultimatum was accepted by Israel
whose troops in any case were still far from the Suez
Canal, but it was rejected by Egypt. On 31 October,
France and the United Kingdom launched an air attack
against targets in Egypt, which was followed shortly by
a landing of their troops near Port Said at the northern
end of the Canal.
General Assembly's first emergency special session
The Security Council held a meeting on 30 October at the
request of the United States, which submitted a draft
resolution calling upon Israel immediately to withdraw
its armed forces behind the established armistice lines.
It was not adopted because of British and French vetoes.
A similar draft resolution sponsored by the Soviet Union
was also rejected. The matter was then transferred to
the General Assembly, in accordance with the procedure
provided by Assembly resolution 377 (V) of 3 November
1950 entitled “Uniting for peace”. Thus, the first
emergency special session of the General Assembly called
under that resolution was convened on 1 November 1956.
In the early hours of the next day, the General Assembly
adopted, on the proposal of the United States,
resolution 997 (ES-I), calling for an immediate
ceasefire, the withdrawal of all forces behind the
armistice lines and the reopening of the Canal. The
Secretary-General was requested to observe and report
promptly on compliance to the Security Council and to
the General Assembly, for such further action as those
bodies might deem appropriate in accordance with the
United Nations Charter.
The resolution was adopted by 64 votes to 5, with 6
abstentions. The dissenters were Australia and New
Zealand, in addition to France, Israel and the United
Kingdom. In explaining Canada's abstention, Lester
Pearson stated that the resolution did not provide for,
along with the ceasefire and a withdrawal of troops, any
steps to be taken by the United Nations for a peace
settlement, without which a ceasefire would be only of a
temporary nature at best.
Before the session, Mr. Pearson had had extensive
discussions with the Secretary-General and he felt that
it might be necessary to establish some sort of United
Nations police force to help resolve the crisis. Mr.
Pearson submitted to the General Assembly, when it
reconvened the next morning, a draft resolution on the
establishment of an emergency international United
Nations force.
Enabling resolutions
The Canadian proposal was adopted by the General
Assembly on the same morning and became resolution 998
(ES-I) of 4 November 1956, by which the Assembly
requested, “as a matter of priority, the
Secretary-General to submit to it within forty-eight
hours a plan for the setting up, with the consent of the
nations concerned, of an emergency international United
Nations Force to secure and supervise the cessation of
hostilities in accordance with all the terms of the
aforementioned resolution 997 (ES-I).” The voting was 57
to none, with 19 abstentions. Egypt, France, Israel, the
United Kingdom and the Soviet Union and Eastern European
States were among the abstainers.
At the same meeting, the General Assembly also adopted
resolution 999 (ES-I), by which it reaffirmed resolution
997 (ES-I) and authorized the Secretary-General
immediately to arrange with the parties concerned for
the implementation of the ceasefire and the halting of
the movement of military forces and arms into the area.
On the same day, the Secretary-General submitted his
first report on the plan for an emergency international
United Nations Force, in which he recommended certain
preliminary steps, including the immediate setting up of
a United Nations Command. All his recommendations were
endorsed by the General Assembly and included in
resolution 1000 (ES-I) adopted on 5 November 1956, by
which the Assembly:
Established a United Nations Command for an
emergency international Force to secure and
supervise the cessation of hostilities in accordance
with all the terms of General Assembly resolution
997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956;
Appointed, on an emergency basis, the Chief of Staff
of UNTSO, Major-General (later Lieutenant-General)
E.L.M. Burns, as Chief of the Command;
Authorized the Chief of the Command immediately to
recruit, from the observer corps of UNTSO, a limited
number of officers who were to be nationals of
countries other than those having permanent
membership in the Security Council, and further
authorized him, in consultation with the
Secretary-General, to undertake the recruitment
directly, from various Member States other than the
permanent members of the Security Council, of the
additional number of officers needed;
Invited the Secretary-General to take such
administrative measures as might be necessary for
prompt execution of the actions envisaged.
The resolution was adopted by 57 votes to none, with 19
abstentions. As with resolution 998 (ES-I), Egypt,
France, Israel, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and
Eastern European States abstained.
Concept and guiding principles
On 6 November, the Secretary-General submitted to the
General Assembly his second and final report on the plan
for an emergency United Nations Force. In this report,
he defined the concept of the new Force and certain
guiding principles for its organization and functioning.
The main points of the report:
(a) At the outset, an emergency international United
Nations Force could be developed on the basis of three
concepts. In the first place, it could be set up on the
basis of principles reflected in the constitution of the
United Nations itself. This would mean that its chief
responsible officer should be appointed by the United
Nations itself and in his functions should be
responsible ultimately to the General Assembly and/or
the Security Council. His authority should be so defined
as to make him fully independent of the policies of any
one nation and his relations to the Secretary-General
should correspond to those of the Chief of Staff of
UNTSO. A second possibility would be for the United
Nations to charge a country, or a group of countries,
with the responsibility to provide independently for an
international Force serving for the purposes determined
by the United Nations. In this approach, which was
followed in the case of the Unified Command in Korea, it
would obviously be impossible to achieve the same
independence in relation to national policies as would
be established through the first concept. Finally, as a
third possibility, an international Force might be set
up in agreement among a group of nations, later to be
brought into an appropriate relationship to the United
Nations. This approach was open to the same reservation
as the second concept and possibly others. The
Secretary-General noted that in deciding on 5 November
1956 to establish a United Nations Command, on an
emergency basis, the General Assembly had chosen the
first type of international force.
(b) The Secretary-General set out certain guiding
principles for the organization and functioning of the
Force:
The decision taken by the General Assembly on the
United Nations Command recognized the independence
of the Chief of Command and established the
principle that the Force should be recruited from
Member States other than the permanent members of
the Security Council. In this context, the
Secretary-General observed that the question of the
composition of the staff and contingents should not
be subject to agreement by the parties involved
since such a requirement would be difficult to
reconcile with the development of the international
Force along the course already being followed by the
General Assembly.
The terms of reference of the Force were to secure
and supervise the cessation of hostilities in
accordance with all the terms of the General
Assembly's resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956.
It followed from its terms of reference that there
was no intent in the establishment of the Force to
influence the military balance in the current
conflict, and thereby the political balance
affecting efforts to settle the conflict. The Force
should be of a temporary nature, the length of its
assignment being determined by the needs arising out
of the current conflict.
(c) Guidelines on the functions to be performed were
outlined as follows:
The General Assembly's resolution of 2 November 1956
urged that “all parties now involved in hostilities
in the area agree to an immediate ceasefire and, as
part thereof, halt the movement of military forces
and arms into the area”, and further urged the
parties to the Armistice Agreements promptly to
withdraw all forces behind the armistice lines, to
desist from raids against those lines into
neighbouring territories and to observe scrupulously
the provisions of the Agreements. These two
provisions combined indicated that the functions of
the United Nations Force would be, when a ceasefire
was established, to enter Egyptian territory with
the consent of the Egyptian Government, in order to
help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal
of non-Egyptian forces and to secure compliance with
the other terms established in the resolution.
The Force obviously should have no rights other than
those necessary for the execution of its functions,
in cooperation with local authorities. It would be
more than an observer corps, but in no way a
military force temporarily controlling the territory
in which it was stationed; nor should the Force have
functions exceeding those necessary to secure
peaceful conditions, on the assumption that the
parties to the conflict would take all necessary
steps for compliance with the recommendations of the
General Assembly. Its functions could, on this
basis, be assumed to cover an area extending roughly
from the Suez Canal to the Armistice Demarcation
Lines established in the Armistice Agreement between
Egypt and Israel.
(d) The Secretary-General indicated that the question as
to how the Force should be financed required further
study. A basic rule, which could be applied
provisionally, would be that a State providing a unit
would be responsible for all costs of equipment and
salaries, while all other costs should be financed by
the United Nations outside its normal budget. It was
obviously impossible to make any estimate of the costs
without knowledge of the size of the Force and the
length of its assignment. The only practical course
therefore would be for the General Assembly to vote on a
general authorization for those costs on the basis of
general principles such as those suggested in the
report.
(e) The Secretary-General stated that, because of the
time factor, he could discuss the question of
participation in the Force with only a limited number of
Member Governments. The reaction so far led him to
believe that it should be possible to meet quickly at
least the most basic need for personnel. It was his hope
that broader participation would be possible as soon as
a plan was approved so that a more definite judgement
might be possible concerning the implications of
participation. Noting that several matters had to be
left open because of the lack of time and the need for
further study, the Secretary-General suggested that
those matters be submitted to exploration by a small
committee of the General Assembly. Such a committee
might also serve as an advisory committee to the
Secretary-General for questions relating to the
operation.
Advisory Committee
After considering the report of the Secretary-General,
the General Assembly adopted, on 7 November, resolution
1001 (ES-I) approving the guiding principles for the
organization and functioning of the emergency
international United Nations Force as expounded in the
Secretary- General's report; concurring in the
definition of the functions of the Force in the report;
and approving provisionally the basic rule concerning
the financing of the Force laid down in that report. The
Assembly established an Advisory Committee composed of
Brazil, Canada, Ceylon, Colombia, India, Norway and
Pakistan. It requested the Committee, whose Chairman was
the Secretary-General, to undertake the development of
those aspects of the planning for the Force and its
operation not already dealt with by the General Assembly
and which did not fall within the area of the direct
responsibility of the Chief of Command. It authorized
the Secretary-General to issue all regulations and
instructions essential to the effective functioning of
the Force, following consultation with the Committee,
and to take all other necessary administrative and
executive action. The Committee was to continue to
assist the Secretary-General in his responsibilities,
and it could request the convening of the General
Assembly if necessary. Finally, the Assembly requested
all Member States to afford assistance as necessary to
the United Nations Command in the performance of its
functions, including arrangements for passage to and
from the area involved.
This resolution, which, with resolution 998 (ES-I) of 4
November, formed the basis for the establishment of the
United Nations Emergency Force, was adopted by 64 votes
to none, with 12 abstentions. France and the United
Kingdom voted this time with the majority. Egypt and
Israel remained with the abstainers, together with South
Africa and the Soviet Union and Eastern European States.
The representatives of France and the United Kingdom
indicated that the resolution was acceptable to their
Governments because it provided, as they had urged, for
an effective international Force in the area. In
explaining his abstention, the representative of the
Soviet Union stated that the establishment of the Force
under General Assembly resolution 1000 (ES-I) and the
plan for its implementation in resolution 1001 (ES-I)
were contrary to the Charter, and that the only reason
for abstaining rather than voting against the proposal
lay in the hope of preventing any further extension of
the aggression against Egypt.
Further General Assembly resolutions
On the same day, 7 November, the General Assembly also
adopted resolution 1002 (ES-I), by which it called once
again upon Israel immediately to withdraw all its forces
behind the armistice lines, and upon France and the
United Kingdom immediately to withdraw all their forces
from Egyptian territory.
The voting was 65 to 1, with 10 abstentions. Israel cast
the lone negative vote. France and the United Kingdom
abstained, together with Australia, Belgium, Laos,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Portugal and
South Africa. The representatives of France and the
United Kingdom indicated that an immediate withdrawal of
their forces could lead to a power vacuum between
Egyptian and Israeli forces and that withdrawal could
only be effected subsequent to proof of the effective
operation of UNEF.
The first emergency special session of the General
Assembly ended on 10 November 1956. Before closing the
session, the Assembly adopted resolution 1003 (ES-I), by
which it decided to refer the matter to its eleventh
regular session which was then about to convene.
During the first emergency special session, the General
Assembly had adopted a total of seven resolutions. By
these resolutions, the Assembly gave the
Secretary-General the authority and support he required
to bring about the cessation of hostilities in Egypt and
the withdrawal of foreign troops from Egyptian territory
with the assistance of a new type of peacekeeping
machinery, the United Nations peacekeeping force. The
idea of such a force, which was to have such an impact
on the work of the United Nations for the maintenance of
international peace and security, came initially from
Mr. Lester Pearson. Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld
made it a practical reality.
INITIAL STAGES OF UNEF
The United Nations Emergency Force was the key element
in the United Nations efforts to resolve the crisis
arising from the military action of the Israeli and
Anglo-French forces against Egypt. It was a
pre-condition for securing the ceasefire and a
pre-condition for bringing about the withdrawal of the
invading forces. Therefore, a priority objective of the
Secretary-General, after the adoption of the enabling
resolutions, was to assemble a usable Force and land it
in Egypt as rapidly as possible.
The establishment of this first peacekeeping Force in
United Nations history was a task of great complexity.
The concept had no real precedent. The nearest parallel
was UNTSO, which also had peacekeeping functions but was
a much simpler operation and did not provide much help
as regards the many organizational and operational
problems involved.
Immediately after the Assembly authorized the Force, the
Chief of Command, General Burns, who was in Jerusalem at
the time, selected a group of UNTSO observers who began
planning the organization of the new Force. The
Secretary-General approached the Governments of the
potential participating countries to obtain the required
military personnel. He also initiated negotiations with
the Egyptian Government to secure its agreement as the
host country for the entry and stationing of the Force
in Egypt.
Negotiations with the Egyptian Government
A
key principle governing the stationing and functioning
of UNEF, and later of all other peacekeeping forces, was
the consent of the host Government. Since it was not an
enforcement action under Chapter VII of the Charter,
UNEF could enter and operate in Egypt only with the
consent of the Egyptian Government. This principle was
clearly stated by the General Assembly in adopting
resolution 1001 (ES-I) of 7 November 1956 concerning the
establishment of UNEF.
Immediately after the adoption of that resolution, the
Secretary-General instructed General Burns to approach
the Egyptian authorities in Cairo in order to prepare
the ground for the prompt implementation of the
resolution. The Government of Egypt had already accepted
the terms of resolution 1000 (ES-I) on the establishment
of a United Nations Command, and this was considered by
the Secretary-General as an acceptance in principle of
the Force itself.
However, before consenting to the arrival of the Force
on its territory, Egypt wished to have certain points in
the Assembly resolution clarified. In particular, it
wanted to know in clearer terms the functions of the
Force, especially in regard to whether, when the Force
reached the Armistice Demarcation Line, the Governments
concerned would agree to the areas to be occupied by it,
how long the Force would stay, whether it was supposed
to have functions in the Suez Canal area apart from
observing the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces and
whether it would stay in the Canal area after the
Anglo-French withdrawal.
Firm assurance was given to the Egyptian authorities
that cooperation with the United Nations would not
infringe Egyptian sovereignty, detract from Egypt's
power freely to negotiate a settlement on the Suez Canal
or submit Egypt to any control from the outside. The
Secretary-General impressed upon those authorities that
the Force provided a guarantee for the withdrawal of
foreign forces from Egypt and that, since it would come
only with Egypt's consent, it could not stay or operate
in Egypt if that consent were withdrawn.
On the basis of the General Assembly's resolutions as
interpreted by the Secretary-General, the Government of
Egypt gave its consent on 14 November to the arrival of
UNEF in Egypt, and the first transport of UNEF troops
took place on the next day.
While the exchange of views that had taken place was
considered sufficient as a basis for the sending of the
first units of UNEF to Egypt, the Secretary-General felt
that a firmer foundation had to be laid for the presence
and functioning of the Force in Egypt and for the
continued cooperation with the Egyptian authorities. He
also considered it essential to discuss personally with
the Egyptian authorities, at the highest level, various
questions which flowed from the decision to send the
Force to Egypt, including the selection of national
contingents.
The Secretary-General therefore visited Cairo from 16 to
18 November. During this visit, he reached agreement
with the Egyptian Government on the composition of the
Force. President Nasser had first opposed the inclusion
of the Canadian, Danish and Norwegian units because they
belonged to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) and because, in his view, Canada and the United
Kingdom were too congeneric. But on the insistence of
the Secretary-General, this opposition was withdrawn.
The basic discussions centred on the stationing and
functioning of the Force.
The good faith agreement
On this essential matter, a “good faith agreement” was
worked out and included in an aide-memoire which served
as the basis for the stationing of UNEF in Egypt. It
noted that the Assembly, by resolution 1001 (ES-I), had
approved the principle that the Force could not be
requested “to be stationed or operate on the territory
of a given country without the consent of the Government
of that country”. It then went on to say:
The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General of the
United Nations have stated their understanding on the
basic points for the presence and functioning of UNEF as
follows:
1. The Government of Egypt declares that, when
exercising its sovereign rights on any matter concerning
the presence and functioning of UNEF, it will be guided,
in good faith, by its acceptance of General Assembly
resolution 1000 (ES-I) of 5 November 1956.
2. The United Nations takes note of this declaration of
the Government of Egypt and declares that the activities
of UNEF will be guided, in good faith, by the task
established for the Force in the aforementioned
resolutions; in particular, the United Nations,
understanding this to correspond to the wishes of the
Government of Egypt, reaffirms its willingness to
maintain UNEF until its task is completed.
3. The Government of Egypt and the Secretary-General
declare that it is their intention to proceed forthwith,
in the light of points 1 and 2 above, to explore jointly
concrete aspects of the functioning of UNEF, including
its stationing and the question of its lines of
communication and supply; the Government of Egypt,
confirming its intention to facilitate the functioning
of UNEF, and the United Nations are agreed to expedite
in cooperation the implementation of guiding principles
arrived at as a result of that joint exploration on the
basis of the resolutions of the General Assembly.
The Secretary-General brought this aide-memoire to the
attention of the General Assembly in a report of 20
November 1956. No objection was raised by the Assembly
in this connection.
Status of the Force agreement
In addition to the good faith agreement, two other
memoranda were agreed upon between the Secretary-General
and President Nasser. One of them set out the
understanding that the area to be occupied by UNEF after
the Israeli withdrawal would be subject to agreement and
that the Force would have no function in the Port Said
and the Suez Canal areas after the withdrawal of the
Anglo-French troops. UNEF could not stay or operate in
Egypt unless Egypt continued its consent. The other
memorandum specifically separated the question of the
reopening of the Suez Canal from the functions of UNEF.
The Secretary-General brought these memoranda to the
attention of the Advisory Committee.
With these agreements, UNEF was set up. Subsequent
discussions were continued between the Secretariat and
the Egyptian authorities to work out more detailed and
comprehensive arrangements on the status of the Force in
Egypt. These arrangements were set out in a letter dated
8 February 1957 from the Secretary-General to the
Minister for Foreign Affairs of Egypt and were accepted
by the latter in his reply of the same date to the
Secretary-General. This exchange of letters constituted
the agreement on the status of the United Nations
Emergency Force in Egypt which the General Assembly
noted with approval in its resolution 1126 (XI) of 22
February 1957.
The status of the Force agreement covered a wide range
of problems, including the premises of the Force and the
use of the United Nations flag, freedom of movement,
privileges and immunities of the Force, civil and
criminal jurisdiction and settlement of disputes or
claims. Two of the key provisions concerned freedom of
movement and criminal jurisdiction. Members of the Force
were to enjoy full freedom of movement in the
performance of their duties. They were to be subject to
the exclusive jurisdiction of their respective national
Governments in respect of any criminal offences which
they might commit in Egypt.
Negotiations with the participating countries
The principles of consent applied not only to the host
Government but also to the participating countries. In
accordance with the principles approved by the General
Assembly, the Force was to be composed of national
contingents accepted for service by the
Secretary-General from among those voluntarily offered
by Member States. Troops from the permanent members of
the Security Council or from any country which, for
geographical and other reasons, might have a special
interest in the conflict would be excluded. In selecting
the contingents, the Secretary-General had to take due
account of the views of the host Government and such
other factors as their suitability in terms of the needs
of the Force, their size and availability, the extent to
which they would be self-contained, the undesirability
of too great a variation in ordnance and basic
equipment, the problem of transportation and the goal of
balanced composition.
The size of the Force was to be determined by the
Commander in consultation with the Secretary-General and
in the light of the functions to be performed. The
original estimate by the Force Commander of the manpower
needs to perform those tasks was the equivalent of two
combat brigades, or about 6,000 men. It was decided that
the national contingents should be sufficiently large to
be relatively self-contained and that the Force should
have adequate support units, including a light air-unit.
From the point of view of balance, it was desirable that
the differences in the size of the units should not be
so great as to lead to excessive dependence on any one
State.
The Secretary-General sought certain assurances from the
participating countries. He pointed out that the
effective functioning of UNEF required that some
continuity of service of the participating units should
be assured in order to enable the Force Commander to
plan his operations. He also insisted that the Commander
of each national contingent should take orders
exclusively from the Force Commander and should be in a
position to exercise the necessary disciplinary
authority with the members of his contingent.
The arrangements between the United Nations and the
contributing countries were expanded and set out in
formal agreements in the form of an exchange of letters
between the Secretary-General and the respective
participating Governments.
By 5 November 1956, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland,
Norway, Pakistan and Sweden had replied affirmatively.
In the following days, Afghanistan, Brazil, Burma,
Ceylon, Chile, Czechoslovakia, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India,
Indonesia, Iran, Laos, New Zealand, Peru, the
Philippines, Romania and Yugoslavia also offered to
provide contingents. In addition, the United States
Government informed the Secretary-General that it was
prepared to help as regards airlifts, shipping,
transport and supplies. Italy agreed to place at the
disposal of the United Nations the facilities of
Capodichino Airport at Naples for the assembly and
transit of UNEF personnel and equipment and to help in
the airlift of personnel and equipment from Italy to
Egypt. The Swiss Government, a non-member State, offered
to defray part of the cost of Swissair charter planes.
UNEF's composition
In consultation with the Force Commander and after
discussions with the Government of Egypt, the
Secretary-General accepted contingents from 10
countries: Brazil, Canada, Colombia, Denmark, Finland,
India, Indonesia, Norway, Sweden and Yugoslavia. The
offers of assistance from the United States, Italy and
Switzerland were also accepted. With the agreement of
Egypt, an air base at Abu Suweir near Ismailia was used
as the central depot for the early contingents.
The extent of the area to be covered by UNEF called for
highly mobile reconnaissance. This need was met by
Yugoslavia, which provided a complete reconnaissance
battalion. Canada later supplied a fully equipped,
light-armoured squadron. Supporting units were obtained
and assigned with the same urgency as those engaged in
patrolling. The Indian contingent was given
responsibility for the supply depot and the service
institute; Canada and India provided units for
transport, the Provost Marshal and signals; Norway and
Canada covered the medical needs. The Canadian
contingent was also made responsible for the ordnance
depot and workshop, the base post office, engineering,
the dental unit, movement control and air support.
General Burns and his group of UNTSO military observers
arrived in Cairo on 12 November 1956 and set up a
temporary headquarters there. The first UNEF units,
composed of Colombians, Danes and Norwegians, flew to
Egypt on 15 and 16 November. They were followed by other
contingents. The target strength of about 6,000 men was
reached in February 1957 after the Brazilian battalion
had arrived at Port Said by sea. With the appointment of
staff officers selected from the participating
countries, the UNTSO military observers returned to
their normal duties in Jerusalem.
The Governments of Indonesia and Finland, which had
agreed to participate in the Force only for a limited
period, withdrew their contingents in September and
December 1957, respectively. The Colombian Government
withdrew its contingent in December 1958. The other
contingents continued to serve with UNEF until the
withdrawal of the Force in 1967. The deployment and
assignment of the contingents were changed from time to
time according to the requirements of the operation.
The strength of the Force remained at the authorized
level of about 6,000 until the end of 1957. In the
following years, it was gradually reduced because the
situation in the area of operation remained quiet and
also because of financial difficulties. There were 5,341
all ranks with the Force in 1960, 5,102 in 1963, 4,581
in 1965 and 3,959 in 1966. In November 1965, a survey
team was sent to the area to examine the possibility of
further reductions. In accordance with its
recommendations, the strength was further brought down
to 3,378 at the time the Force began its withdrawal in
May 1967.
UNEF's organization
The United Nations Emergency Force, established by the
General Assembly, was a subsidiary organ of the Assembly
under Article 22 of the Charter. It was directed by the
Secretary-General under the general authority of the
General Assembly.
The Secretary-General was authorized to issue all
regulations and instructions which might be essential to
the effective functioning of the Force and to take all
other necessary administrative and executive actions. To
assist him in these matters, he set up an informal
military group at Headquarters composed of military
representatives of participating countries and headed by
his military adviser – Major-General I.A.E. Martola
(Finland), during the formative period. The
Secretary-General was also assisted by the Advisory
Committee established under Assembly resolution 1001
(ES-I).
The command of the Force was assumed in the field by the
Force Commander (originally designated as the Chief of
Command), who was appointed by the General Assembly on
the recommendation of the Secretary-General. The
Commander was operationally responsible for the
performance of all functions assigned to the Force by
the United Nations and for the deployment and assignment
of the troops placed at the disposal of the Force. He
had direct authority for the operation of the Force and
also was responsible for the provision of facilities,
supplies and auxiliary services. He reported to the
Secretary-General and was responsible to him.
The national contingents were under the command of the
contingent commanders, who were appointed by their
respective Governments. These contingents remained part
of their respective national armed forces but, during
their assignment to UNEF, they owed international
allegiance and were placed under the operational control
of the United Nations. This control was exercised
through the contingent commanders, who received their
instructions from the Force Commander.
The officers and soldiers of each contingent continued
to wear their national uniforms but with United Nations
insignia. The blue beret and helmet were created by
Secretary-General Hammarskjöld during the formative days
of UNEF.
Military police were provided by the Force Commander for
all camps, establishments and other premises occupied by
the Force and for such areas where the Force was
deployed in the performance of its functions. Elsewhere,
UNEF military police might be employed in so far as such
employment was necessary to maintain discipline and
order among members of the Force, subject to
arrangements with the authorities of the host country
and in liaison with those authorities.
CEASEFIRE AND WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES
Establishment of the ceasefire
The first objective of Secretary-General Hammarskjöld
was to secure a ceasefire in accordance with the call of
the General Assembly contained in resolution 997 (ES-I)
of 2 November 1956. During the meeting at which this
resolution was adopted, the representative of Israel
stated that his Government agreed to an immediate
ceasefire, provided that a similar answer was
forthcoming from Egypt. On the same day, the Egyptian
Government informed the Secretary-General that it would
accept the call for a ceasefire on the condition that
military actions against Egypt were stopped. The
Secretary-General immediately notified Israel, France
and the United Kingdom of Egypt's position and called11
upon all four parties to bring hostilities to an end.
On 4 November, the Secretary-General requested all four
parties concerned to bring to a halt all hostile
military action by 2400 hours GMT on the same day. In
identical messages addressed to the Governments of
France and the United Kingdom, he pointed out that in
the light of the replies received from Egypt and Israel,
it was obvious that the positions of France and the
United Kingdom would determine whether or not it would
be possible to achieve a ceasefire between Egypt and
Israel. He urged the two Governments to give him a
definitive acceptance on his ceasefire call at the
earliest possible moment. On 5 November, France and the
United Kingdom informed the Secretary-General that as
soon as the Governments of Egypt and Israel signified
acceptance of, and the United Nations endorsed a plan
for, an international Force with the prescribed
functions, they would cease all military action.
Later in the day, the British representative announced
that a ceasefire had been ordered at Port Said. Orders
had also been given to cease all bombing forthwith
throughout Egypt, and other forms of air action would be
limited to the support of any necessary operation in the
Canal area. Also on the same day, Egypt accepted the
Secretary-General's request for a ceasefire without any
attached conditions and Israel informed the
Secretary-General that in the light of Egypt's
declaration, it confirmed its readiness to agree to a
ceasefire.
In an aide-mémoire dated 5 November, the
Secretary-General informed France and the United Kingdom
that, since on that date the General Assembly had taken
a decisive step towards setting up the international
Force by establishing a United Nations Command, and
since Egypt and Israel had agreed, without conditions,
to a ceasefire, the conditions for a general ceasefire
would seem to be established.
In their replies of 6 November, the two Governments
announced that their forces were being ordered to cease
fire at midnight GMT on the same day, pending
confirmation that Egypt and Israel had accepted an
unconditional ceasefire and that there would be a United
Nations Force competent to secure and supervise the
attainment of the objectives of resolution 997 (ES-I).
The Secretary-General promptly informed Egypt and Israel
that the ceasefire would become effective at midnight.
He noted that the Assembly had not made the ceasefire
dependent on the creation or the functioning of UNEF,
since its call for a ceasefire and its decision to
establish the Force were in separate resolutions.
The ceasefire was established at midnight GMT on 7/8
November and, except for isolated incidents, generally
held.
Withdrawal of the Anglo-French force
At the same time as the Secretary-General was taking
urgent steps to set up the new Force, he was pressing
France and the United Kingdom for an early withdrawal of
their forces from the Port Said area.
The two Governments told him that their troops would be
withdrawn as soon as the proposed United Nations Force
was in a position to assume effectively the tasks
assigned to it and, in particular, to ensure that
hostilities would not be resumed in the area.
The Secretary-General therefore endeavoured to move the
first units of UNEF to Egypt and build up its strength
as rapidly as he could. But the establishment of this
first United Nations peacekeeping force was not an easy
job, and it took time to obtain the required units from
the various contributing countries, transport them to
the area of operations and make them fully operational.
The first units from the Colombian, Danish and Norwegian
contingents arrived in the area on 15 and 16 November
and were immediately deployed in the Suez Canal area.
On 24 November, the General Assembly adopted resolution
1120 (XI), by which it noted with regret that two thirds
of the French forces and all of the British forces
remained in Egypt, and it reiterated its call to the
British and French Governments for the immediate
withdrawal of their forces.
In messages dated 3 December, the British and French
Governments noted that an effective United Nations Force
was currently arriving in Egypt, that the
Secretary-General had accepted the responsibility for
organizing the task of clearing the Suez Canal as
expeditiously as possible, that free and secure transit
would be re-established through the Canal when it was
cleared and that the Secretary-General would promote as
quickly as possible negotiations with regard to the
future regime of the Canal on the basis of the six
requirements set out in the Security Council's
resolution 118 (1956) of 13 October 1956. The two
Governments confirmed their decision to continue the
withdrawal of their forces from the Port Said area
without delay.
The Secretary-General immediately instructed General
Burns to get in touch with the Anglo-French Commander
and work out with him arrangements for the complete
withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces without delay,
ensuring that UNEF would be in a position to assume its
responsibilities in the Port Said area by the middle of
December. On 22 December, the withdrawal of the
Anglo-French forces was completed and UNEF took over the
Port Said area.
Initial withdrawal of the Israeli forces: November
1956—mid-January 1957
The negotiations undertaken by the Secretary-General to
achieve the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces
required nearly two months; those regarding the
withdrawal of Israeli forces took much longer. By
resolution 997 (ES-I) of 2 November 1956, the General
Assembly had urged the parties to the Armistice
Agreements promptly to withdraw all forces behind the
armistice lines, to desist from raids across those lines
into neighbouring territory and to observe scrupulously
the Armistice Agreements. In resolution 1002 (ES-I) of 7
November, the Assembly, after noting its decision to
establish a United Nations Command for an international
force, called once again upon Israel immediately to
withdraw its forces behind the armistice lines.
On 7 November, the Prime Minister of Israel, Mr. David
Ben Gurion, in a statement to the Israeli Knesset
(Parliament), stated that the armistice lines between
Egypt and Israel had no validity and that “on no account
will Israel agree to the stationing of a foreign force,
no matter how called, in her territory, or in any of the
areas occupied by her”. On hearing of this statement,
the Secretary-General immediately wrote to the Minister
for Foreign Affairs of Israel, Mrs. Golda Meir, to
inform her that this position was in violation of the
resolutions of the General Assembly and, if maintained,
would seriously complicate the task of giving effect to
those resolutions.
On 21 November, in reply to queries by the
Secretary-General, the Government of Israel stated that
there had already been a withdrawal of its forces for
varying distances along the entire Egyptian frontier. It
reiterated its position regarding the withdrawal of the
Israeli forces and indicated that the satisfactory
arrangements it sought were such as would ensure
Israel's security against the recurrence of the threat
or danger of attack and against acts of belligerency by
land or sea. Noting that it had not yet had an
opportunity to discuss the question of satisfactory
arrangements to be made with the United Nations in
connection with UNEF, it stated that it was awaiting
information on the proposed size, location and
stationing arrangements of the Force and on the methods
proposed for the discharge of its functions as laid down
in the General Assembly's resolutions of 2, 5 and 7
November. It was also awaiting a clarification by Egypt
on its policy and intention with respect to belligerency
or peace with Israel which must influence Israel's
dispositions on matters affecting its security.
At a meeting held on 24 November, the General Assembly
adopted resolution 1120 (XI) by which, after noting that
the Israeli forces had not yet been withdrawn behind the
armistice lines, reiterated its call to Israel to comply
forthwith with its resolution. On the same day, the
representative of Israel informed the Secretary-General
that the equivalent of two infantry brigades had been
withdrawn from Egyptian territory into Israel.
In a letter dated 1 December, the representative of
Israel advised the Secretary-General that on the morning
of 3 December, Israeli forces would be removed from a
wide belt of territory (about 50 kilometres) in
proximity to the Suez Canal along its entire length.
Elements of UNEF immediately entered the evacuated area,
although progress in this process was slowed down
because of minefields and destroyed roads. On 11
December, Israel announced that it was ready to effect
further withdrawal of troops in the Sinai peninsula in
order to enable UNEF to extend its occupation eastward.
General Burns met with General Moshe Dayan, the Israeli
Commander, on the morning of 16 December. They agreed on
specific arrangements for a first phase of withdrawal,
and UNEF troops moved forward to within five kilometres
of new Israeli positions. Regarding further withdrawals,
General Dayan informed the UNEF Commander that,
according to his instructions, the Israeli forces were
to withdraw from the remainder of the Sinai at an
approximate rate of 25 kilometres each week during the
next four weeks. This plan was considered by General
Burns to be inadequate. Consequently, at his request, a
new withdrawal proposal was submitted by the Israeli
Government on 21 December. The new proposal envisaged
that the remaining Israeli withdrawal would take place
in two phases. The second phase would involve a full
Israeli withdrawal behind the armistice lines at an
unstated date.
In accordance with this proposal, a further withdrawal
of Israeli forces took place on 7 and 8 January 1957 to
a north-south line roughly following meridian 33
degrees, 44 minutes, leaving no Israeli forces west of
El Arish. On 15 January, the Israeli forces withdrew
eastward another 25 to 30 kilometres, except in the area
of Sharm el Sheikh. This phase involved the entry into
El Arish and St. Catherine's Monastery of the United
Nations Emergency Force, which had closely followed the
withdrawing Israeli troops.
Sharm el Sheikh and the Gaza Strip
A
day earlier, on 14 January, the Government of Israel had
informed the Secretary-General that by 22 January the
Sinai Desert would be entirely evacuated by Israeli
forces with the exception of the Sharm el Sheikh area,
that is “the strip on the western coast of the Gulf of
Aqaba which at present ensures freedom of navigation in
the Strait of Tiran and in the Gulf”. Reporting on this
matter to the General Assembly, the Secretary-General
stated that under the terms of the Assembly's
resolution, the Israeli forces should be withdrawn also
from that area.
In this connection, he observed that the international
significance of the Gulf of Aqaba might be considered to
justify the right of innocent passage through the Strait
of Tiran and the Gulf in accordance with recognized
rules of international law. He did not consider that a
discussion of the various aspects of this matter and its
possible relation to the action requested in the General
Assembly on the Middle East crisis fell within the
mandate established for him in resolution 999 (ES-I) of
4 November. Like the ceasefire, withdrawal was a
preliminary and essential phase in the process through
which a viable basis might be laid for peaceful
conditions in the area. The General Assembly, in giving
high priority to the ceasefire and withdrawal, in no way
disregarded all the other aims which must be achieved in
order to create more satisfactory conditions than those
prevailing during the period preceding the crisis. The
basic function of UNEF, which was to help maintain
quiet, gave the Force great value as a background for
efforts towards resolving such pending problems,
although it was not in itself a means to that end.
On 19 January 1957, the General Assembly adopted
resolution 1123 (XI) by which, after recalling its
resolutions of 2, 4, 7 and 24 November 1956, requested
the Secretary-General “to continue his efforts for
securing the complete withdrawal of Israel in pursuance
of the above-mentioned resolutions, and to report on
such completion to the General Assembly, within five
days”.
In pursuance of that resolution, the Secretary-General
held further discussions with Israeli representatives on
20 and 23 January. On 23 January, Israel presented its
views in an aide-memoire on the Israeli position on the
Sharm el Sheikh area and the Gaza Strip. Its position on
each of the two areas was:
(a) For the Sharm el Sheikh area, Israel's aim was
the simultaneous reconciliation of two objectives:
the withdrawal of Israeli forces from that area and
the guaranteeing of permanent freedom of navigation
by the prevention of belligerence. In this matter,
Egyptian compliance with the decision of the
Security Council – resolution 95 (1951) of 1
September 1951 – had a legal and chronological
priority over Israel's duty to fulfil
recommendations in which Egypt had an interest.
Accordingly, Israel formally requested the
Secretary-General to ascertain Egypt's intentions
with respect to the Council's 1951 resolution
concerning the Suez Canal.
(b) For the Gaza Strip, Israel, after questioning
the legality of the Egyptian occupation of Gaza from
1948 to 1956 and criticizing its actions during this
period, proposed a plan under which the Israeli
military forces would be withdrawn but an Israeli
civilian administration would remain to deal with
security and administrative matters; the United
Nations Emergency Force would not enter and be
deployed in the Gaza area, but Israel would
cooperate with the United Nations Relief and Works
Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA) regarding the care and maintenance of the
refugees in the area. In this connection, Israel was
ready to work out with the United Nations a suitable
relationship with respect to the Gaza Strip.
The position of the Secretary-General was set out in his
report23 of 24 January 1957:
In connection with the question of Israeli
withdrawal from the Sharm el Sheikh area, attention
had been directed to the situation in the Strait of
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba. This problem was of
longer duration and was not directly related to the
current crisis. It followed from principles guiding
the United Nations that the Israeli military action
and its consequences should not be elements
influencing the solution of this problem. The
Secretary-General concluded that upon the withdrawal
of the Israeli forces, UNEF would have to follow
them in the same way as it had in other parts of the
Sinai, its movements being determined by its duties
in respect of the ceasefire and the withdrawal. In
accordance with the general legal principles
recognized as decisive for the deployment of the
Force, UNEF should not be used in such a way as to
prejudice the solution of the controversial
questions involved.
Regarding the status of Gaza, the United Nations
could not recognize a change of the de facto
situation created under the Armistice Agreement, by
which the administration and security in the Strip
were left in the hands of Egypt, unless the change
was brought about through settlement between the
parties. Nor could it lend its assistance to the
maintenance of a de facto situation contrary to the
one created by the Agreement. These considerations
excluded the United Nations from accepting Israeli
control over the area even if it were of a
non-military character. Deployment of UNEF in Gaza
under the resolutions of the General Assembly would
have to be on the same basis as its deployment along
the Armistice Demarcation Line and in the Sinai
peninsula. Any broader function for it in that area,
in view of the terms of the Armistice Agreement and
a recognized principle of international law, would
require the consent of Egypt.
Second withdrawal of Israeli forces: February 1957
On 2 February 1957, the General Assembly, after
receiving the Secretary-General's report, adopted two
resolutions. By resolution 1124 (XI), it deplored the
failure of Israel to complete its withdrawal behind the
Armistice Demarcation Line and called upon it to do so
without delay. By resolution 1125 (XI), the Assembly,
recognizing that withdrawal by Israel must be followed
by action which would assure progress towards the
creation of peaceful conditions, called upon Egypt and
Israel scrupulously to observe the provisions of the
1949 General Armistice Agreement and considered that
“after full withdrawal of Israel from the Sharm el
Sheikh and the Gaza areas, the scrupulous maintenance of
the Armistice Agreement requires the placing of the
United Nations Emergency Force on the Egyptian-Israel
Armistice Demarcation Line and the implementation of
other measures as proposed in the Secretary-General's
report, with due regard to the considerations set out
therein with a view to assist in achieving situations
conducive to the maintenance of peaceful conditions in
the area”. The General Assembly further requested the
Secretary-General, in consultation with the parties
concerned, to take steps to carry out these measures and
to report to it as appropriate.
On 4 February, the Secretary-General met with the
representative of Israel to discuss implementation of
the Assembly's resolutions. Israel presented to him an
aide-memoire in which it raised two points. First, it
requested the Secretary-General to ask the Government of
Egypt whether Egypt agreed “to the mutual and full
abstention from belligerent acts, by land, air and sea,
on withdrawal of Israeli troops”. Secondly, Israel
sought clarification as to whether “immediately on the
withdrawal of Israeli forces from the Sharm el Sheikh
area, units of the United Nations Emergency Force will
be stationed along the western shore of the Gulf of
Aqaba in order to act as a restraint against hostile
acts, and will remain so deployed until another
effective means is agreed upon between the parties
concerned for ensuring permanent freedom of navigation
and the absence of belligerent acts in the Strait of
Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba”.
During the same meeting, the Secretary-General asked
whether, with regard to Gaza, it was understood by the
Government of Israel that the withdrawal had to cover
elements of civilian administration as well as military
troops. He considered a clarification on this point to
be a prerequisite to further consideration of the
Israeli aide-memoire. There was, in his view, an
unavoidable connection between Israel's willingness to
comply fully with General Assembly resolution 1124 (XI)
as concerned the Gaza Strip and what might be done
towards maintaining quiet in the Sharm el Sheikh area,
and it was unrealistic to assume that the latter
question could be solved while Israel remained in Gaza.
With regard to the second point raised by Israel, the
Secretary-General noted that the debate in the General
Assembly and the report on which it was based made it
clear that the stationing of the United Nations
Emergency Force at Sharm el Sheikh would require
Egyptian consent. In the light of this implication of
Israel's question, the Secretary-General considered it
important, as a basis for his consideration of the
aide-memoire, to learn whether Israel itself consented
in principle to the stationing of UNEF units on its
territory in implementation of the functions established
for the Force by the Assembly's resolutions and, in
particular, its resolution 1125 (XI) where it was
indicated that the Force should be placed on the
Egyptian-Israeli Armistice Demarcation Line.
This meeting was followed by an exchange of
communications between the Secretary-General and the
representative of Israel, and a meeting between them was
held on 10 February. But these were all inconclusive, as
each side wanted to receive the clarifications it had
sought before replying to the questions addressed to it.
In this connection, the Secretary-General stated that
the fact that Israel had not found it possible to
clarify elements decisive for the consideration of its
requests had complicated the efforts to achieve
implementation of the Assembly's resolutions.
In reporting on this matter to the General Assembly on
11 February, the Secretary-General commented that the
relationship between resolution 1124 (XI) on withdrawal
and resolution 1125 (XI) on measures to be carried out
after withdrawal afforded the possibility of informal
explorations of the whole field covered by these two
resolutions, preparatory to negotiations. Later, the
results of such explorations might be used in the
negotiations through a constructive combination of
measures, representing for the two countries parallel
progress towards the peaceful conditions sought.
However, such explorations could not be permitted to
invert the sequence between withdrawal and other
measures, nor to disrupt the evolution of negotiations
towards their goal. Progress towards peaceful
conditions, following the general policy suggested in
the last report of the Secretary-General, on which
General Assembly resolution 1125 (XI) was based, had to
be achieved gradually.
Final withdrawal of Israeli forces: March 1957
In concluding his report, the Secretary-General stated
that, in the situation now facing the United Nations,
the General Assembly, as a matter of priority, might
wish to indicate how it wished him to proceed with
further steps to carry out its decisions.
The Assembly did not adopt any further resolution on
this matter after the Secretary-General's report, but
the Israeli Government eventually softened its position
on the withdrawal from the Gaza Strip, although it
maintained its denunciation of the 1949 General
Armistice Agreement with Egypt and continued to oppose
the stationing of the United Nations Emergency Force on
its side of the Armistice Demarcation Line.
On 1 March, the Foreign Minister of Israel announced in
the General Assembly the decision of her Government to
act in compliance with the request contained in Assembly
resolution 1124 (XI) to withdraw behind the Armistice
Demarcation Line.
The same day, the Secretary-General instructed the
Commander of UNEF as a matter of utmost urgency to
arrange for a meeting with the Commander-in-Chief of the
Israeli forces in order to agree with him on
arrangements for the complete and unconditional
withdrawal of Israel in accordance with the Assembly's
decision.
On 4 March, the declaration of 1 March was confirmed by
the Israeli Government. The same day, General Burns met
at Lydda with General Dayan. Technical arrangements were
agreed upon for the withdrawal of the Israeli forces and
the entry of UNEF troops into the Gaza Strip during the
hours of curfew on the night of 6/7 March. Agreement was
also reached for a similar takeover of the Sharm el
Sheikh area on 8 March.
On 6 March, General Burns reported that UNEF troops were
in position in all camps and centres of population in
the Gaza Strip. The operation was carried out according
to plan and without incident. By 0400 hours GMT, all
Israelis had withdrawn from the Strip with the exception
of an Israeli troop unit at Rafah Camp. By agreement,
that last Israeli element was to be withdrawn at 1600
hours GMT on 8 March and full withdrawal from the Sharm
el Sheikh area would be effected at the same time. These
withdrawals took place as agreed and thus the
Secretary-General was able to report to the General
Assembly on 8 March 1957 full compliance with its
resolution 1124 (XI) of 2 February 1957.
UNEF DEPLOYMENT
Deployment along the Armistice Demarcation Line
In its resolution 1125 (XI), on measures to be taken
after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces from Egyptian
territory, the General Assembly called upon the
Governments of Egypt and Israel to observe scrupulously
the provisions of the 1949 General Armistice Agreement
and considered that, after full withdrawal of Israel
from the Sharm el Sheikh and Gaza areas, “the scrupulous
maintenance of the Armistice Agreement requires the
placing of the United Nations Emergency Force on the
Egyptian-Israel Armistice Demarcation Line”.
On 11 February 1957, the Secretary-General reported to
the Assembly that Egypt had reaffirmed its intent to
observe fully the provisions of the Armistice Agreement
to which it was a party, on the assumption that
observance would be reciprocal. The Secretary-General
drew attention to the desire expressed by Egypt to see
an end to all raids and incursions across the Armistice
Line in both directions, with effective assistance from
United Nations auxiliary organs to that effect.
Israel maintained its denunciation of the Armistice
Agreement. In a letter of 25 January, the representative
of Israel had stated that “Israel does not claim that
the absence of an armistice agreement means the
existence of a state of war with Egypt, even though
Egypt insisted on the existence of a state of war even
when the Agreement was in existence. Israel is prepared
to confirm its position on this by signing immediately
with Egypt an agreement of non-belligerency and mutual
non-aggression, but the Agreement, violated and broken,
is beyond repair”.
The Secretary-General did not accept Israel's
denunciation as valid, as there was no provision in the
1949 Agreement for unilateral termination of its
application. Consequently, the machinery for the
supervision of the Armistice Agreement was maintained by
UNTSO.
In his report of 8 March 1957, the Secretary-General
informed the General Assembly that arrangements would be
made through which, without any change in the legal
structure or status of UNTSO, its functions in the Gaza
area would be placed under the operational control of
UNEF. Close cooperation between the two United Nations
peacekeeping operations was maintained.
Regarding the placing of UNEF along the Armistice
Demarcation Line, the Secretary-General interpreted this
as requiring the deployment of the Force on both sides
of the Line. The Egyptian Government had consented to
the deployment of UNEF on its territory along the Line
as well as in the Sharm el Sheikh area on the basis of
the “good faith agreement” set out in the aide-memoire
of November 1956. At the beginning of February 1957, the
Secretary-General had sought clarification from Israel
as to whether, as a question of principle, it agreed to
the stationing of UNEF units on its side of the
Armistice Demarcation Line. No clarification was
obtained and, in a letter dated 6 February to the
representative of Israel, the Secretary-General said he
assumed that, at least for the present, Israel's reply
to this question was essentially negative. In view of
the Israeli position, UNEF could be deployed only on the
Egyptian side.
As of 8 March 1957, UNEF was deployed along the western
side of the Armistice Demarcation Line along the Gaza
Strip, along the international frontier between the
Sinai and Israel, as well as in the Sharm el Sheikh
area.
Phases of deployment and activities
UNEF began operating in Egypt on 12 November 1956, when
the Force Commander and a group of military observers
detached from UNTSO set up a temporary headquarters in
Cairo. It was withdrawn ten-and-a-half years later, on
18 May 1967, at the request of the Egyptian Government.
The operation of the Force during this period may be
divided into four phases: the first phase, which
extended from mid-November to late December 1956, was
centred on the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces
from the Port Said area. The second, from that time to
early March 1957, concerned the withdrawal of the
Israeli forces from the Sinai peninsula, except the Gaza
Strip and the Sharm el Sheikh area. The third, in March,
related to those areas. The fourth and last phase, which
began with the deployment of UNEF along the borders
between Egypt and Israel, covered a period of more than
10 years from March 1957 until May 1967, during which
time the Force effectively maintained peace in those
sensitive areas.
First phase: Suez Canal area (November–December
1956)
When UNEF became operational in mid-November 1956, the
ceasefire had been achieved and was generally holding.
The Anglo-French forces were occupying the Port Said
area including Port Fuad in the northern end of the Suez
Canal. The Israeli forces were deployed east of the
Canal about 10 kilometres from it. The Secretary-General
was actively negotiating with the three Governments
concerned and pressing for the early withdrawal of their
forces from Egyptian soil.
The objectives of UNEF were to supervise the cessation
of hostilities and to assist in the withdrawal process
once agreement was reached on this matter. Shortly after
its arrival in Egypt, UNEF was interposed between the
Anglo-French and the Egyptian forces, occupying a buffer
zone. All incidents involving the ceasefire were
reported to the proper authorities, who were urged to
prevent recurrences. No provisions had been made for the
establishment of joint machinery whereby incidents could
be examined and discussed. UNEF's role was limited to
investigating, reporting and, if warranted, protesting
to the relevant authorities.
By arrangements with the Anglo-French forces, units of
UNEF entered Port Said and Port Fuad and took
responsibility for maintaining law and order in certain
areas, in cooperation with the local authorities. The
Force also undertook guard duty of some vulnerable
installations and other points.
In the period of transition, when the Anglo-French
forces were preparing to leave and during the withdrawal
process, UNEF undertook certain essential administrative
functions such as security and the protection of public
and private property, with the cooperation of the
Governor and the Police Inspector in Port Said. With the
sanction of the local authorities, UNEF personnel also
performed administrative functions with respect to
public services, utilities and arrangements for the
provisioning of the local population with foodstuffs,
and exercised limited powers of detention. All
administrative and policing responsibilities were turned
over to the Egyptian authorities the day following the
Anglo-French evacuation.
Other tasks of the Force included clearing minefields in
the Suez Canal area and arranging for exchanges of
prisoners and detainees between the Egyptian Government
and the Anglo-French command. In the last stage of the
withdrawal of the Anglo-French troops from Port Said and
Port Fuad, UNEF units were stationed around the final
perimeter of the zone occupied by the withdrawing
forces, thus preventing clashes between them and the
Egyptian troops.
Second phase: Sinai peninsula (December 1956–March
1957)
After the withdrawal of the Anglo-French forces, UNEF
concentrated its efforts on maintaining the ceasefire
between the Egyptian and Israeli forces and on arranging
for Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. The
Israeli forces withdrew from the Sinai peninsula, with
the exception of the Gaza and the Sharm el Sheikh areas,
in three stages: on 3 December 1956, on 7 and 8 January
1957 and from 15 to 22 January 1957.
On the whole, the functions performed by UNEF in the
Sinai were similar to those undertaken in the Canal
area. The Force was interposed between the Egyptian and
Israeli forces in a temporary buffer zone from 3
December onwards, moving eastbound as the Israeli forces
withdrew, and in accordance with pre-arranged
procedures.
During the successive stages of the Israeli withdrawal,
UNEF temporarily undertook some local civic
responsibilities, including security functions in a few
inhabited areas, handing over such responsibilities to
the Egyptian civilian authorities as soon as they
returned to their posts. The Force also arranged and
carried out exchanges of prisoners of war between Egypt
and Israel and discharged certain investigatory
functions. It cleared minefields in the Sinai and
repaired portions of damaged roads and tracks crossing
the peninsula.
Third phase: Gaza Strip and Sharm el Sheikh (March
1957)
After 22 January 1957, Israel held on to the last two
areas it still occupied. The persistent negotiations to
ensure withdrawal are described above. The withdrawal
from the Gaza Strip took place on 6 and 7 March 1957 and
that from the Sharm el Sheikh area from 8 to 12 March.
In accordance with the arrangements agreed to by the
Egyptian Government, a UNEF detachment was stationed in
Sharm el Sheikh following the withdrawal of the Israeli
forces. This detachment maintained an observation post
and kept the Strait of Tiran under constant watch.
In the Gaza Strip, two local conditions were of special
concern to UNEF as it moved into the area. It was across
the Armistice Demarcation Line along the Strip that the
greatest number of infiltrations and raids had occurred
during past years and there were in the area a large
number of Palestinian Arab refugees, who were being
assisted by UNRWA.
UNEF units entered the Gaza Strip on 6 March as the
withdrawal of Israeli forces began. As a first step,
arrangements were made between the Force Commander and
the Israeli authorities for the United Nations to assume
its responsibilities in the Strip as the Israeli troops
and civil administrators withdrew.
On 7 March, General Burns notified the population of
Gaza that UNEF, acting in fulfilment of its functions as
determined by the General Assembly and with the consent
of the Government of Egypt, was being deployed in the
area for the purpose of maintaining quiet during and
after the withdrawal of the Israeli forces. He also
announced that until further arrangements were made,
UNEF had assumed responsibility for civil affairs in the
area and that UNRWA would continue to provide food and
other services as in the past.
The involvement of UNEF in civil administration was of a
purely temporary nature, pending the re-establishment of
local civilian authority. In this connection, UNEF
cooperated closely with UNRWA in meeting the needs of
the local population. The operation of the Force during
this initial period was greatly facilitated by the
presence in Gaza of an important branch of UNRWA and by
the fact that the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice
Commission had its headquarters in Gaza and made
available to the Force its personnel and its
communications facilities.
Final phase: deployment along the borders (March
1957–May 1967)
After the completion of the withdrawal of all foreign
forces from Egyptian territory, the main objective of
UNEF was to supervise the cessation of hostilities
between Egypt and Israel. Its basic functions were to
act as an informal buffer between the Egyptian and
Israeli forces along the Armistice Demarcation Line
(ADL) and the international frontier in order to avoid
incidents, prevent illegal crossings of the Line by
civilians of either side for whatever purposes, and to
observe and report on all violations of the Line whether
on land, sea or in the air.
To perform these functions, UNEF troops were deployed on
the western side of the ADL and the international
frontier, covering a distance of 273 kilometres. The
Sinai coast from the northern end of the Gulf of Aqaba
to the Strait of Tiran, a further distance of 187
kilometres, was kept under observation by UNEF air
reconnaissance. As indicated earlier, a UNEF detachment
was stationed at Sharm el Sheikh near the Strait of
Tiran.
By day, the entire length of the ADL (about 59
kilometres) was kept under observation by some 72
intervisible observation posts. Each post was manned
during daylight hours; by night, the sentries were
withdrawn and replaced by patrols of five to seven men
each. The patrols moved on foot, covering the length of
the ADL on an average of three rounds each night and
giving particular attention to roads likely to be used
by infiltrators. Platoon camps were set up to the rear
of the posts, each holding a reserve detachment
available to go to the aid of an observation post or
patrol should the need arise. Telephone communications
by day and a system of flare signals, supplemented by
wireless, at night ensured a speedy response to calls
for help.
Along the international frontier, rough terrain and
scattered minefields restricted the access roads for
potential infiltrators, who tended to confine their
activities to certain areas. These sensitive areas were
covered by a system of patrols. Eight outposts were
established along the frontier. Motor patrols from these
outposts covered the areas between the outposts and
certain tracks. In addition to ground observers, the
entire length of the international frontier was also
patrolled by air reconnaissance planes on a daily basis,
later reduced to three times a week. Any suspicious
activity seen from the air could be checked by ground
patrols dispatched from the outposts.
To prevent infiltration and incidents, UNEF secured the
cooperation of the Egyptian authorities. The inhabitants
of Gaza were officially informed that the Government of
Egypt, as a matter of policy, was opposed to
infiltration across the Armistice Demarcation Line. They
were notified that they were forbidden to approach the
ADL within 50 to 100 metres by day and 500 metres by
night. The police in Gaza were instructed to take
effective measures to find persons responsible for
laying mines and for other incidents and to prevent
recurrences. The local Palestinian police also
cooperated with UNEF in preventing infiltrations. UNEF
was authorized to apprehend infiltrators and persons
approaching the ADL in suspicious circumstances. In
practice, this applied to a zone extending up to 500
metres from the line. The persons so apprehended were
interrogated by UNEF and then were handed over to the
local police.
In the performance of their duties, UNEF soldiers were
not authorized to use force except in self-defence. They
were never to take the initiative in the use of force,
but could respond with fire to an armed attack upon
them, even though this might result from a refusal on
their part to obey an order from the attacking party not
to resist. UNEF maintained close liaison with the two
parties, particularly with the Egyptian authorities as
representatives of the host Government.
UNEF enjoyed full freedom of movement in the Gaza Strip
and between the Sinai posts, UNEF headquarters and the
units deployed along the Armistice Demarcation Line.
This included freedom of flight over the Sinai peninsula
and the Gaza Strip for UNEF aircraft, as well as the
manning of the Gaza airport by UNEF.
The deployment of UNEF along the ADL raised a question
of the respective responsibilities of the Force and
UNTSO. As indicated earlier, Israel denounced the
General Armistice Agreement with Egypt in early November
1956, but the United Nations did not accept this
unilateral action. Therefore, the Chairman of the
Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission and the UNTSO
military observers had remained at their posts
throughout the Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip and
afterwards. Upon the withdrawal of the Israeli forces,
the Secretary-General, as a practical arrangement and
without any change in the legal status of the Mixed
Armistice Commission, placed the UNTSO personnel
assigned to EIMAC under the operational control of the
Commander of UNEF. In view of its position with respect
to the General Armistice Agreement, the Government of
Israel lodged its complaints of violations of the ADL
only with UNEF, but the Force maintained that official
investigations of incidents should be carried out
through the Armistice Commission. In practice, problems
arising between Israel and the United Nations relating
to matters covered by the General Armistice Agreement
were resolved in a practical way, with UNEF taking over
some of the duties previously performed by UNTSO.
The activities carried out by UNEF following its
deployment along the Armistice Demarcation Line and the
international frontier, and the methods followed in this
connection, remained virtually unchanged until the
withdrawal of the Force in May 1967. Its area of
operations, which had been one of the most disturbed
areas in the Middle East, became remarkably quiet.
Incidents, such as crossings of the ADL/international
frontier, firing across the Line and air violations,
naturally continued to occur, but they were relatively
infrequent and generally of a minor nature. Virtually
uninterrupted peace prevailed in the area, thanks to the
presence and activities of UNEF.
UNEF withdrawal
While quiet prevailed along the Egyptian-Israeli borders
after November 1956, there was continued tension in
other sectors of the Middle East, particularly on the
Israel-Jordan and Israel-Syria fronts. After the
creation, in 1964, of the Palestine Liberation
Organization and its main group, El Fatah, there
appeared to be a new level of organization and training
of Palestinian commandos. Palestinian raids against
Israel, conducted mainly from Jordanian and Syrian
territory, became a regular occurrence, and the Israeli
forces reacted with increasingly violent retaliation.
There was a marked contrast between the quiet along the
Egyptian border and the confrontation situation in other
sectors.
In early 1967, tension between Israel and Syria again
reached a critical level, mainly because of disputes
over cultivation rights in the demilitarized zone near
Lake Tiberias. For years, Syria complained that Israelis
were illegally seizing lands belonging to Arab
Palestinians in the demilitarized zone, and the
cultivation of disputed land had led to frequent firing
incidents between Israeli and Syrian forces. Efforts
within the Mixed Armistice Commission failed. On 7 April
1967, an exchange of fire across disputed farmland led
to heavy shelling of Israeli villages by Syrian
artillery and intensive air attacks by Israel against
Syrian targets – the most serious clash since 1956. The
incidents of 7 April were followed by a heightening of
tension in the entire region, despite appeals by
Secretary-General U Thant for restraint, and the
moderating efforts of UNTSO.
In the evening of 16 May, the UNEF Commander received a
request from the Egyptian Commander-in-Chief of the
armed forces for withdrawal of “all UN troops which
installed OP's [observation posts] along our borders”.
The General who handed the message to the Force
Commander told him that UNEF must order immediate
withdrawal from El Sabha and Sharm el Sheikh, commanding
the Strait of Tiran and therefore access to the Red Sea
and southern Israel. The UNEF Commander replied that he
did not have authority to do that. The
Secretary-General, on being informed, gave instructions
to the Commander to be “firm in maintaining UNEF
positions while being as understanding and as diplomatic
as possible in your relations with local UAR [United
Arab Republic] officials”. While the Secretary-General
sought clarifications from Cairo, Egyptian troops moved
onto UNEF's line, occupying some United Nations posts.
The Secretary-General met with members of the UNEF
Advisory Committee and told them of the events in the
field, making it known that if a formal request for
UNEF's withdrawal came from the Egyptian Government he
would have to comply. He pointed out that the Force was
on Egyptian territory only with the consent of the
Government and could not remain there without it. He
also consulted members of the Security Council. The
various meetings held by the Secretary-General showed
that within the United Nations there was a deep division
among the membership of the Advisory Committee and the
Security Council on the course of action to be followed.
After consulting the Advisory Committee, the
Secretary-General informed the representative of Egypt
that while he did not question in any sense Egypt's
authority to deploy its troops as it saw fit on its own
territory, the deployment of Egyptian troops in areas
where UNEF troops were stationed might have very serious
implications for UNEF and its continued presence in the
area.
In the meantime, the Egyptian Foreign Minister in Cairo
summoned representatives of nations with troops in UNEF
to inform them that UNEF had terminated its tasks in
Egypt and the Gaza Strip and must depart forthwith. The
Governments of India and Yugoslavia decided that,
whatever the decision of the Secretary-General, they
would withdraw their contingents from UNEF. The same
day, 18 May, Egyptian soldiers prevented UNEF troops
from entering their posts.
While these activities were taking place, the
Secretary-General raised with the Israeli Government the
question of stationing UNEF on the Israeli side of the
Line, thus maintaining the buffer, but this was declared
entirely unacceptable to Israel. Shortly thereafter, the
Permanent Representative of Egypt delivered a message to
the Secretary-General stating his Government's decision
to terminate UNEF's presence in the territory of Egypt
and the Gaza Strip and requesting steps for withdrawal
as soon as possible. The Secretary-General informed
contributing countries he would report to the General
Assembly and the Security Council about the events,
stating it was up to Member countries to decide whether
the competent organs should or could take up the matter
and pursue it accordingly. He then informed Egypt that
the request would be complied with, while indicating his
serious misgivings. UNEF's Commander was instructed to
take the necessary action for withdrawal to begin on 19
May and end in the last days of June.
During two tense days from 16 to 18 May 1967, the
Secretary-General did all he could to persuade Egypt not
to request the withdrawal of UNEF and to persuade Israel
to accept the Force on its side of the border. But
neither Government agreed to cooperate. In such
circumstances, the Secretary-General could have brought
the matter before the Security Council by invoking
Article 99 of the Charter, but he chose not to do so
because he knew that with the United States and the
Soviet Union firmly on opposing sides of the question,
no action could be taken by the Council.
The fundamental fact is that United Nations peacekeeping
operations are based on the principle of consent. To
maintain UNEF in Egypt against the will of the Egyptian
Government, even if it had been possible to do so, which
was not the case, would have created a dangerous
precedent which would have deterred potential host
Governments from accepting future United Nations
peacekeeping operations on their soil.
In the case of UNEF, its withdrawal would not have, in
itself, necessarily led to war in the area. Following an
appeal by the Secretary-General, the Government of
Israel made it known to U Thant that it would exercise
restraint but would consider a resumption of terrorist
activities along the borders, or the closure of the
Strait of Tiran to Israeli shipping, as casus belli.
Immediately after the withdrawal of UNEF, the
Secretary-General increased the number of UNTSO
observers of the Egypt-Israel Mixed Armistice Commission
to provide a United Nations presence along the Armistice
Demarcation Line, and he arranged to visit Cairo on 22
May to discuss with the Egyptian Government possible
security arrangements along the Egyptian-Israeli
borders. However, just before he arrived in Cairo,
President Nasser announced the closure of the Strait of
Tiran. With this decision the die was cast, and, on 5
June, full-fledged war erupted.
Some UNEF units which were awaiting repatriation were
caught up in the fighting in Gaza, and 15 United Nations
troops were killed. All military personnel had gone by
13 June, except for the Force Commander and a small
group of staff officers who left on 17 June.
CONCLUSION
UNEF is a telling example of the importance of United
Nations peacekeeping forces and their limitations. Its
establishment in October 1956 put an end to a
destructive war and, for more than 10 years, it
effectively maintained peace in one of the most
sensitive areas of the Middle East. But in the absence
of a complementary peacemaking effort, the root cause of
the conflict between Egypt and Israel remained
unresolved. Moreover, because Israel refused to accept
UNEF on its territory, the Force had to be deployed only
on the Egyptian side of the border, and thus its
functioning was entirely contingent upon the consent of
Egypt as the host country. Once that consent was
withdrawn, its operation could no longer be maintained. |
